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This	 comparative	 case	 analysis	 focuses	 on	 the	 approaches	 of	 the	
Czech	and	Slovak	governments	to	Russian	disinformation	activities,	
with	 particular	 attention	 to	 the	 securitization	 of	 the	 threat.	 The	
paper	argues	that	the	extent	of	energy	relations	with	Russia	plays	an	
important	role	in	the	securitization	of	the	threat	posed	by	the	said	
state.	 It	 employs	 a	 rational	 model	 of	 policy-making	 to	 better	
understand	the	rationale	 for	the	decisions	of	 the	actors	 leading	to	
the	different	approaches	taken	by	the	governments	of	the	examined	
states.	The	analysis	shows	that	while	the	Czech	approach	seems	to	





and	 resilience,	 whereas	 a	 rather	 pragmatic	 approach	 of	 Slovakia	
leads	to	increasing	vulnerability	of	disinformation	activities.	
	








subsequent	 declaration	 of	 independence,	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 officially	
annexed	 Crimea	 (Grant	 2015).	 This	 unprecedented	 aggression	 from	 Russia	
marked	a	significant	turning	point	in	the	post-Cold	war	European	security	order	
(Averre	2016).	A	fundamental	change	came	also	with	the	new	form	of	the	Russian	
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At	 the	 Wales	 summit,	 NATO	 condemned	 Russia’s	 aggression	 and	 decided	 to	
respond	to	the	threat	of	hybrid	activities	leading	in	development	of	the	Readiness	
Action	Plan	and	a	strategy	for	combating	hybrid	threats	(NATO	2019).	European	
Union’s	 response	was	 no	 different	 from	NATO’s,	 as	 the	 European	 Parliament	
accused	Russia	of	waging	an	undeclared	hybrid	war	against	Ukraine	(including	
information	warfare)	and	called	for	a	strategy	to	counter	the	Russian	propaganda	
campaign	 directed	 towards	 the	 EU	 and	 its	 eastern	 neighbours	 (European	
Parliament	2015).	Both	NATO	and	EU	almost	immediately	began	to	securitize	the	
Russian	disinformation	campaigns.	At	national	 level,	however,	member	states’	
responses	 were	 more	 diverse.	 The	 article	 will	 therefore	 try	 to	 answer	 the	
following	 research	 question:	Why	 have	 two	 both	NATO	 and	 EU	member	 states	
adopted	different	approaches	to	the	Russian	federation?	
	
To	 better	 understand	 the	 motives	 behind	 these	 differences,	 this	 paper	 will	
examine	the	issue	through	the	lens	of	a	rational	policy-making	model.	This	model	










the	Copenhagen	 school,	matters	become	security	 issues	when	a	 securitization	
actor	(government,	bureaucratic	apparatus,	etc.)	 identifies	them	as	a	threat	by	
means	 of	 a	 speech	 act	 and	 requires	 them	 to	 protect	 the	 referent	 object	 by	
adopting	 extraordinary	 measures	 (Buzan,	 Wæver	 and	 De	 Wilde	 1998).	 The	
securitization	 is	 an	 intersubjective	 process	 that	 is	 directly	 linked	 to	 security	





must	 be	 accepted	 by	 the	 relevant	 audience,	 which	 means	 that	 effective	
securitization	is	audience-focused	(ibid.).	
	
In	 this	 paper,	 the	 variable	will	 refer	 to	 the	 securitization	move	 itself	 (i.e.	 to	 a	
speech	 act	 that	 aims	 to	 recognize	 the	 Russian	 disinformation	 campaign	 as	 a	
threat)	because	 the	author	aims	 to	examine	 the	decisions	of	 the	policymakers	
rather	 than	 the	 reactions	 of	 relevant	 audiences.	 Our	 variable	 will	 be	
differentiated	on	a	simple	dichotomous	scheme	meaning	that	the	securitization	
move	 is	 present	 or	 not.	 As	 an	 indicator	 for	 this	 variable,	 we	 choose	 explicit	
statements	of	the	Russian	disinformation	threat	in	the	key	strategic	documents	




















security	 policy	 in	 two	 selected	 states.	 Since	 the	 analysis	 focuses	 on	 different	





The	Czech	Republic	 and	 the	Slovak	Republic	were	 chosen	as	 the	most	 similar	
cases	 due	 to	 their	 differing	 outcomes	 in	 terms	 of	 approach	 to	 the	 Russian	
disinformation	threat,	while	sharing	a	number	of	similarities.	Following	the	logic	
of	 the	 research	 question,	 both	 states	 are	 members	 of	 NATO	 and	 the	 EU.	 In	
addition,	 both	 states	 also	 participate	 in	 Visegrad	 Group	 (and	 other	 Central	
European	initiatives).	As	for	one	of	the	limits	of	chosen	rational	model	which	is	
sometimes	described	 as	 „inadequately	 sensitive	 to	 the	historical,	 political	 and	





period	 from	 February	 2014	 (marking	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 events	 leading	 to	
annexation	Crimea)	to	February	2020.	The	analysis	will	therefore	include	official	







As	 this	work	will	 focus	on	 the	 interests	and	rationale	which	stand	behind	 the	
actors’	 decisions	 to	 choose	 different	 approaches	 to	 the	 same	 threat,	 rational	
choice	theory	will	help	to	guide	our	analysis.	For	this	reason,	further	explanation	
of	 the	 theory	 and	 its	 fundamental	 assumptions	 is	 needed.	 Rational	 theory	 is	
derived	 from	neoclassic	economic	 theory,	which	views	particular	outcomes	as	
the	 result	 of	 aggregated	 decisions	 of	 many	 rational	 individuals	 who	 seek	 to	
maximize	 their	 egoistic	 interests	 (Levi	 1997).	 However,	 a	 rational	 approach	
should	not	be	viewed	merely	as	a	pursuit	of	monetary	assets	that	set	aside	social	





and	 constraints.	 Simply	 put,	 actors	 choose	 between	 alternatives	 and	 act	
consistently	 in	 relations	 of	 preference	 or	 indifference	 taking	 into	 account	
constraints	and	anticipated	reactions	and	subsequently	act	 in	accordance	with	
their	beliefs	(De	Mesquita	2010).	Our	objective	is	to	identify	the	actors’	goals	and	







For	 this	 reason,	 rational	 choice	 theory	 employs	 a	 number	 of	 simplifying	





the	 general	 public	 that	 exceed	 costs	 by	 the	 greatest	 amount	 and	 in	 the	 same	
manner	abstain	from	policies	when	the	costs	exceed	the	gains	(ibid.).	
	
The	second	assumption	 is	 that	of	self-interest	of	 the	actors.	 It	says	 that	actors	
make	choices	which	they	believe	will	lead	to	the	most	feasible	outcome	for	them	
as	defined	by	their	personal	values	or	preferences	(De	Mesquita	2010).	However,	
this	 assumption	 can	 be	 somewhat	misleading.	 As	 Levi	 (2009)	 points	 out,	 the	
rational	 choice	 does	 not	 require	 the	 assumption	 that	 individuals	 are	 self-
interested,	and	interests	of	others	can	be	taken	into	account.	Hague,	Breslin	and	
Harrop	 (2016)	 argue	 that	 people	 also	 pursue	 altruistic	 projects	 because	 they	






policies	 with	 the	 greatest	 benefits	 and	 least	 costs“	 (Dye	 2013,	 20).	 The	
assumption	 of	 rationality	 limits	 how	 actors	 choose	 their	 actions	 according	 to	










Shortly	 after	 the	 annexation	 of	 Crimea,	 the	 Czech	 Foreign	 Ministry	 issued	 a	
statement	 condemning	 Russia’s	 actions	 and	 refused	 to	 recognize	 the	
independence	of	Crimea	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	Czech	Republic	2014).	
After	 that,	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 joined	 the	 EU	 sanctions	 and	 since	 then	 has	
maintained	 a	 critical	 stance	 towards	 Russia,	 which	 is	 also	 reflected	 in	 the	
strategic	documents.	The	Czech	Security	Strategy	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	
the	 Czech	 Republic	 2015a),	 despite	 its	 publication	 prior	 to	 the	 beginning	 of	
Russian	 intervention,	 highlights	 the	 threat	 of	 hybrid	 warfare.	 It	 is	 implicitly	
aimed	 at	 Russia,	 as	 it	 states	 that	 some	 countries	 seek	 to	 alter	 the	 current	
international	 order	 and	 build	 exclusive	 spheres	 of	 influence	 by	 destabilizing	













2015b)	 was	 published	 and	 it	 stated	 that	 Russia	 has	 been	 fundamentally	
destabilizing	the	European	security	architecture.	In	spite	of	highlighting	Russia	
as	 an	 important	 political	 and	 economic	 partner	 for	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 the	
Concept	 declares	 that	 Czech	 foreign	 policy	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 Russian	
Federation's	 respect	 for	 international	 law	 and	 the	 territorial	 integrity	 and	
sovereignty	of	its	neighbours.	
	
In	 2016,	 the	 Czech	 government	 approved	 an	 important	 document	 called	 the	
National	 Security	Audit	 (Ministry	of	 the	 Interior	of	 the	Czech	Republic	2016),	
which	aimed	to	find	out	how	the	Czech	Republic	is	prepared	to	face	the	current	
serious	security	threats	and	assess	the	state’s	resilience	to	the	presented	threats.	
In	 this	 document,	 hybrid	 threats	 and	 foreign	 power	 influence	 have	 been	
identified	as	two	of	the	top	ten	most	serious	threats	to	the	state.	For	the	first	time	





In	 accordance	 with	 the	 Audit,	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 established	 Centre	 Against	
Terrorism	 and	Hybrid	 Threats	 as	 a	 specialised	 analytical	 and	 communication	
unit	 responsible	 for	 monitoring,	 evaluating	 and	 countering	 disinformation	
campaigns	 related	 to	 internal	 security.	 The	 centre's	 activities	 include	 the	





responsible	 for	 deteriorating	 security	 situation	 in	 Europe,	 which	 is	 openly	
realizing	 its	 power	 ambitions	 and	 does	 not	 hesitate	 to	 violate	 the	 norms	 of	
international	law.	In	addition,	the	document	points	out	that	Russia	uses	a	number	
of	 hybrid	 campaign	 tools	 against	 EU	 and	 NATO	 member	 states,	 including	
disinformation	campaigns	and	cyber-attacks	(Ministry	of	Defence	of	 the	Czech	




power	 ambitions	 while	 increasingly	 employing	 hybrid	 means	 (including	
disinformation	campaigns)	to	weaken	cohesion	of	NATO	and	EU	members.		
	
We	 can	 see	 that	 the	political	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	Russian	disinformation	
threat	 is	 at	 a	 high	 level	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 and	 the	 securitization	move	 is	
clearly	 present.	 In	 its	 key	 strategic	 documents,	 we	 can	 observe	 the	 explicit	
proclamation	 of	 the	 threat	 posed	 by	 Russian	 hybrid	 activities,	 including	 the	
disinformation	 campaigns.	 The	 credibility	 of	 government	 documents	 and	
measures	 is	 further	 enhanced	 by	 annual	 reports	 of	 the	 Security	 Information	
Service	 which	 point	 out	 to	 Russian	 influence	 activities	 on	 the	 state	 territory	
(Security	 Information	 Service	 2019).	 The	 establishment	 of	 the	 Centre	Against	














Slovak	 Republic	 2014)	 and	 subsequently	 joined	 the	 EU	 sanctions	 (despite	
subsequent	 criticism	 from	 then	 Prime	 Minister	 Robert	 Fico)	 (Vilček	 2014).	




conventional	 means	 of	 warfare	 such	 as	 hybrid	 threats.	 It	 also	 highlights	 the	
change	of	the	revision	of	the	European	security	architecture	which	is	the	„…result	






Security	 Strategy	 of	 the	 Slovak	 Republic,	 the	 Defence	 Strategy	 of	 the	 Slovak	
Republic	and	the	Military	Strategy	of	Slovak	Republic	(Ministry	of	Defence	of	the	




than	 the	White	Paper	as	 it	describes	 the	annexation	of	Crimea	by	 the	Russian	
Federation	 as	 an	 extremely	 worrying	 case	 of	 violation	 of	 the	 fundamental	
principles	and	standards	of	 international	 law.	Nevertheless,	 it	still	emphasises	
the	 importance	 of	 dialogue	 with	 Russia.	 With	 regard	 to	 hybrid	 threats,	 the	
strategy	acknowledges	that	the	armed	conflict	in	Europe	need	not	take	the	form	
of	direct	military	confrontation	between	states,	but	it	can	take	the	form	of	hybrid	
warfare.	 The	 Defence	 Strategy	 conversely	 does	 not	 mention	 Russia	 or	 its	
activities,	but	it	accentuates	increase	of	hybrid	activities	and	it	assumes	that	the	




















Hybrid	 Threats	 and	 main	 communication	 channel	 towards	 EU	 Hybrid	 Fusion	 Cell.	 It	 also	
designated	National	Security	Analytic	Centre	of	SIS	as	a	National	Cooperation	Centre	for	Hybrid	
Threats	with	the	objective	of	detecting	and	evaluating	hybrid	threats.	However,	so	far	there	is	no	




Despite	Slovakia’s	progress	 in	recent	years,	 there	are	still	 several	problematic	
points	regarding	the	securitization	of	Russian	disinformation	campaigns.	In	none	
of	 the	 examined	 documents	 are	 Russian	 disinformation	 activities	 explicitly	
proclaimed	 as	 a	 potential	 threat.	 The	 2017	 Security	 Strategy,	 being	 the	 only	
document	 critical	 to	 Russia	 here,	 still	 remains	 officially	 unapproved.	 Hybrid	
threats	 are	mentioned	 in	 all	 of	 the	 examined	 documents,	 not	 to	mention	 the	
separate	 document	 addressing	 this	 issue.	 However,	 in	 the	 Concept,	 we	 can	
observe	the	avoidance	of	naming	the	potential	threat	actors.	Instead,	the	Concept	
refers	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 security	environment	 that	 require	action	 to	be	 taken.	
Slovakia	therefore	remains	silent	to	the	Russian	disinformation	threat,	in	spite	of	




of	 the	 threat	 by	 the	 audience,	 another	drawback	 can	be	 observed	 in	 terms	of	
presentation	of	the	disinformation	threat	to	the	general	public.	Although	Peter	
Pellegrini	 (Prime	 Minister	 at	 the	 time)	 stated	 that	 he	 considered	 the	 non-
adoption	of	the	new	Security	Strategy	to	be	simply	a	technical	problem	(as	all	the	














of	 the	main	goals	of	 the	mentioned	Concept	 (Government	Office	of	 the	Slovak	
Republic	2018,	7).	All	 these	 factors	subsequently	 lead	 to	a	state	where	Slovak	
Republic	lags	behind	in	strategic	communications	capabilities	with	many	other	




























and	 37%	 in	 recent	 years	 (Eurostat	 2020a),	 i.e.	 below	 the	 EU	 average	 (55%)	
(Lavička	and	Kačer	2019).	This	 state	 is	due	 to	 the	Czech	Republic’s	 long-term	
efforts	to	diversify	the	import	portfolio	and	transit	routes	of	oil	and	gas	beginning	
in	1996	(Jirušek,	Kuchyňková	and	Vlček	2020).	The	Czech	Republic	benefits	from	
its	 substantial	 coal	 resources,	 which	 cover	 most	 of	 the	 total	 primary	 energy	
supply	(see	Annex	A).	Russia	accounted	for	a	maximum	of	8%	of	total	imports	
(see	 Figure	 2).	 However,	 the	 situation	 in	 oil	 and	 petroleum	 products	 is	
completely	different	because	approximately	98%	of	oil	demand	is	met	by	imports	
(IEA	2016).	Nevertheless,	due	to	successful	diversification,	Russia’s	share	of	total	
imports	 counts	 for	 roughly	 35%	 in	 the	 last	 few	 years.	 The	 Czech	 Republic's	
























in	 this	 regard	were	 the	 efforts	 of	 President	 Zeman	 to	 create	 a	 Czech-Russian	
Discussion	 Forum.	 This	 platform	 however	 failed	 to	 meet	 its	 expectations	
(Havlíček	 et	 al.	 2019).	 The	 Czech	 Republic	 has	 decided	 to	 take	 an	 unyielding	
approach	 towards	 Russia,	 pointing	 out	 its	 violations	 of	 international	 law	 and	
threats	in	the	foreign	policy.	Perhaps	for	this	reason,	Russia	stopped	viewing	the	
Czech	 Republic	 as	 a	 partner	 with	 a	 potential	 for	 further	 development	 of	 the	
energy	relations	(Tichý	and	Dubský	2020).	Altogether,	the	energy	sector	in	the	
Czech	Republic	is	characterized	by	relatively	low	level	of	politicization.	There	are	
no	 fears	of	negative	Russian	 influence	over	 its	gas	and	oil	 supplies	due	 to	 the	
existence	 of	 alternative	 supply	 routes.	Nevertheless,	 the	 potential	 increase	 in	





Slovakia’s	 economic	 relations	 with	 Russia	 follow	 the	 same	 trend	 as	 Czech-
Russian	relations	after	the	annexation	of	Crimea	due	to	Slovakia’s	participation	
in	 EU	 sanctions.	 Russia's	 privileged	 position	 as	 a	 monopoly	 supplier	 of	 raw	
materials	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 the	 main	 customer	 of	 Slovak	 production	
decreased	 after	 2014	 (see	 Figure	 3),	 but	 the	 level	 of	 dependence	 on	 energy	
supplies	remains	high	as	the	cooperation	in	the	field	of	energy	and	fuel	complex	
is	 the	 basis	 of	 Slovak-Russian	 economic	 relations	 (Kašťáková	 2017).	 Despite	

















government	 took	 over	 the	 dominant	 gas	 supplier	 Slovenský	 plynárenský	
priemysel	which	could	provide	further	leverage	to	the	Russian	side	(ibid.).	
	
The	 vulnerability	 to	 Russian	 supply	 cuts	 is	 further	 increased	 by	 Slovakia’s	
position	 as	 a	 major	 transit	 country.	 The	 Slovak	 government	 is	 interested	 in	
maintaining	 the	 country’s	 transit	 which	 is	 viewed	 as	 an	 important	 part	 of	
Slovakia’s	energy	security	(Diallo	et	al.	2018).	Gas	transit	generates	substantial	
revenues	to	the	state	budget	and	the	interest	of	the	Slovak	government	is	to	keep	




opposes	 this	project.	Consequently,	 the	completion	of	 this	 transit	 route	would	
allow	Russia	to	„play	the	transit	countries	against	each	other”	(Takáč	2018,	225).	
Similarly	 to	 the	 Czech	Republic,	 Slovakia	 is	 also	 100%	dependent	 on	Russian	













foreign	 policy	 that	 continuously	 emphasised	 the	 mutual	 dialog	 and	 the	
importance	of	economic	relations	with	particular	attention	to	energy	(Ministry	
of	Foreign	and	European	Affairs	of	the	Slovak	Republic	2020).	Russia	has	been	
eager	 to	maintain	 these	 relations	 and	 has	 regularly	 emphasised	 that	 positive	
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cooperation	 with	 Slovakia	 will	 continue	 with	 a	 potential	 for	 its	 deepening	
(regardless	of	any	“short-term	disagreements”)	(Tichý	and	Dubský	2020,	6).	All	
this	 should	be	viewed	alongside	 the	 fact	 that	Russia	 inclines	 to	use	 its	energy	
sector	 as	 a	 political	 tool	 (as	with	 Russian	 retaliation	 to	 Slovakia	 for	 enabling	
reverse	 gas	 flow	 to	 Ukraine	 in	 2014)	 (Mesík	 2015;	 Takáč	 2018),	 which	 puts	






have	 decided	 to	 put	 the	 security	 interests	 clearly	 first	 and	 began	 the	
securitization	of	Russian	disinformation	campaigns.	All	proclamations	and	steps	
were	taken	regardless	of	Russia's	potential	response,	as	the	ultimate	goal	was	to	
achieve	 maximum	 resilience	 to	 the	 Russian	 hybrid	 activities.	 This	 was	 made	
possible	not	only	by	the	Russia’s	subordinate	role	in	the	Czech	Republic’s	overall	








While	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 has	 decided	 to	 take	 a	 firm	 stance	 against	 Russian	
hybrid	activities	and	disinformation	campaigns	in	particular,	Slovak	Republic	has	
taken	a	 somewhat	more	 lenient	approach.	 It	 can	be	argued	 that	Slovak	policy	
towards	 Russia	 is	 ambivalent	 to	 a	 certain	 degree	 as	 it	 aims	 to	 maintain	
cooperation	 with	 Russia	 while	 also	 imposing	 sanctions	 and	 accepting	
countermeasures	to	its	hybrid	threats	(in	accordance	with	EU	and	NATO	policies).	
This	pragmatic	approach	is	characterized	by	accentuating	importance	of	energy	








it	 allows	 for	 more	 objective	 threat	 assessment	 and	 consequently	 for	 better	
preparedness	 and	 resilience	 to	 disinformation	 threats.	 While	 the	 Slovak	






to	 raise	 the	 awareness	 about	 Russian	 hybrid	 and	 disinformation	 activities	 to	





7 	The	 primacy	 of	 the	 economic	 rationale	 in	 mutual	 relations	 is	 also	 visible	 on	 the	 example	 of	
Slovakia’s	 decision	 to	 enable	 gas	 reverse	 flow	 to	 Ukraine	 after	 Russian	 cut-off	 despite	 the	
potential	threat	of	retaliation	by	Russia	(Deutsche	Welle	2014).	











interpretation	 of	 political	 reality,	 and	 therefore	 alternative	 explanations	 that	
would	 be	 reached	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 different	 theoretical	 anchorage	 cannot	 be	
ruled	out.	For	example,	the	chosen	model	did	not	allow	for	consideration	of	an	
ideological	dimension,	which	undoubtedly	represents	an	important	aspect	in	the	









to	be	driven	by	security	 interests,	while	 in	Slovakia,	 the	economic	goals	are	of	
primary	 importance.	 As	 this	work	 argues,	 this	 is	 due	 to	 the	 extent	 of	 energy	
relations	 with	 Russia,	 as	 the	 Slovak	 Republic	 is	 largely	 dependent	 on	 energy	
imports	from	Russia	and	gains	substantial	revenue	from	its	position	as	a	major	
transit	 route	 for	 Russian	 gas	 and	 oil.	 The	 current	 Slovak	 approach	may	 have	
several	 negative	 security	 implications	 however	 (such	 as	 the	 vulnerability	 to	
Russian	 influence	 and	 disinformation	 threats),	 and	 therefore	 its	 modification	
needs	to	be	considered.	Change	for	the	better	may	come	with	a	new	government	
elected	 in	2020	which	committed	 itself	 to	actively	combat	disinformation	and	
hybrid	threats	(Government	Office	of	the	Slovak	Republic	2020a).	Most	recently,	
Igor	 Matovič’s	 Cabinet	 proposed	 an	 ambitious	 plan	 to	 set	 up	 a	 Coordinated	
mechanism	of	the	Slovak	Republic's	resilience	to	information	operations	which	
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RUSKA	 DEZINFORMACIJSKA	 NEVARNOST:	 PRIMERJALNA	 ŠTUDIJA	
ČEŠKIH	IN	SLOVAŠKIH	PRISTOPOV	
	
Primerjalna	analiza	 se	osredotoča	na	pristope	 češke	 in	 slovaške	vlade	do	 ruskih	
dezinformacijskih	dejavnosti,	s	posebnim	poudarkom	na	grožnji	listinjenja.	Avtorja	
prispevka	trdita,	da	ima	obseg	energetskih	odnosov	z	Rusijo	pomembno	vlogo	pri	




primarnega	 pomena	 ekonomski	 cilji,	 pri	 čemer	 je	 glavni	 dejavnik	 pomen	
energetskih	odnosov	z	Rusijo.	Češki	pristop	se	v	tem	prispevku	šteje	za	ustreznega,	
saj	omogoča	bolj	objektivno	oceno	nevarnosti	in	posledično	boljšo	pripravljenost	in	
odpornost,	medtem	ko	precej	pragmatičen	pristop	Slovaške	vodi	do	večje	ranljivosti	
dezinformacijskih	dejavnosti.	
	
Ključne	besede:	dezinformacija;	Ruska	federacija;	listinjenje;	energetski	odnosi;	
racionalni	model.	
